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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. OWEN NEERINGS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
SYDNIE KUHRE, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 89-0088 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS, by and 
through counsel, John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah 
Legal Clinic, submits the following BRIEF in support of his 
appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendants UTAH 
STATE BAR and SYDNIE KUHRE. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Art. VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (1953 as amend-
ed). On February 6, 1989, the trial court entered a summary 
judgment in favor of defendants (T.R. 213-215). A notice of 
appeal filed herein was dated March 3, 1989. (T.R. 240-241) 
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. James 
S. Sawaya, Judge presiding. The final order granted a 
summary judgment to the defendants. 
In a minute entry dated February 15, 1989, Judge Sawaya 
stated that (1) the court did not believe that specific 
findings of fact were required under the rules to support 
the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, but (2) the 
court Mwould point to Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffsf Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in 
support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" for the 
facts and law upon which the court based its ruling (T.R. 
227). Hence, this appeal is based upon the five (5) points 
argued in the defendants' memorandum. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency to 
which the privacy provisions of the Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act apply. 
(2) Whether applying the privacy provisions of the 
Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act 
to the UTAH STATE BAR would be an unconstitutional infringe-
ment by the legislative branch into the province of the 
judicial branch. 
2 
(3) Whether there is a right to privacy protected by 
the Utah Constitution, Utah statutes or decisions of this 
Court. 
(4) Whether the internal policies and practices of the 
UTAH STATE BAR give rise to a standard of conduct to which 
the BAR should be held accountable. 
(5) Whether the public disclosure of private informa-
tion gives rise to a common law claim of invasion of priva-
cy. 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS 
A. The controlling constitutional provision is: 
The supreme court by rule shall govern 
the practice of law, including admission 
to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. I 
Utah Const., Art. VIII, § 4. | 
B. The controlling statutes are: 
Utah Archives and Records Services 
and Information Practices Act: 
§ 63-2-60 
* * * 
(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recog-
nizes two fundamental constitutional rights: 
(a) the right of privacy in relation to personal 
data gathered by state agencies . . . . 
§ 63-2-61 As used in this act: 
* -k -k 
(2) "State agency" means a department, 
division, board, bureau, commission, 
council, institution, authority, or 
other unit, however designated, of the 
state. 
(3) "Public offices" and "Public 
3 
officers" mean, respectively, the offices 
and officers of any court, department, 
division, board, commission, bureau, 
council authority, institution, or other 
agency of the state or any of its politi-
cal subdivisions. 
/\ /> /\ 
(8) "Responsible authority" means any 
state office or state official established 
by law or executive order as the body 
responsible for the collection, use, or 
supervision of any set of data on indivi-
duals or summary data. 
k k k 
(12) "Private data" means data on indivi-
duals collected and maintained by state 
government which is available only to the 
appropriate state agencies for the uses 
specified in Subsection 63-2-85.3(1), 
to others by the express consent of the 
individual, and to the individual himself or 
next of kin when information is needed to 
acquire benefits due a deceased person. 
§ 63-2-85.3 
/> /\ /\ 
(4) Appropriate safeguards shall be estab-
lished in relation to the collection, 
storage, exchange, dissemination, and use 
of data on individuals to assure that all 
data is accurate, complete, and current and 
that regard for the right of privacy is af-
forded to the individual who is the subject 
of the data. . . . 
§ 63-2-85.4 . . . The rights of individuals 
on whom data is stored or is to be stored 
and the responsibilities of each responsible 
authority in regard to that data are as 
follows: 
k k k 
(4) No confidential or private data shall 
be used other than for the stated 
purposes nor shall it be disclosed to any 
person other than the individual to whom 
the data pertains, without express consent 
of that individual, except that next of kin 
may obtain information needed to acquire 
benefits due a deceased person. 
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§ 63-2-88 (1) Any responsible authority who 
violates any provision of this act shall be 
liable to any person, suffering damage as 
a result thereof, and the person damaged 
may bring an action against the state to re-
cover any damages sustained, plus costs in-
curred and reasonable attorney fees. 
§§ 78-51-10, -21, -25, see addendum. 
C. The controlling case authorities are: 
Barnard v. Chamberlain, et al., No. 88-
2131, slip op. at 6, F.2d (10th Cir. 
March 8, 1990)(the Utah State Bar is a 
"governmental agency"). | 
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1980)(there is a right of privacy recog-
nized in Utah); see also Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F.Supp. 
1308 (D.Utah 1987). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, a recent law school graduate, took the 
Bar examination in February, 1988, in order to qualify to 
practice law in Utah. Before the individual applicants were 
notified of the exam results, defendant Sydnie Kuhre, a Utah 
State Bar employee at all relevant times, told an associate 
of plaintiff that plaintiff had failed the exam. Approxi-
mately, one week later, plaintiff received formal notifica-
tion that he had failed the exam. 
Plaintiff appealed his exam results through the proce-
dures established by the Utah State Bar. Again, before 
plaintiff was notified of the result of his appeal, Ms. 
Kuhre told the same associate of plaintiff that plaintiff's 
appeal was unsuccessful. The Utah State Bar notified 
plaintiff approximately one week later that plaintiff's 
appeal was unsuccessful. 
Plaintiff sued the Utah State Bar and Ms. Kuhre for (1) 
violating the Utah Information Practices Act, (2) violating 
plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy, (3) negligently 
breaching a duty of confidentiality established by the Utah 
State Bar's own internal policies, and (4) tortiously 
invading plaintiff's privacy by publically disclosing 
private facts about the plaintiff. The trial court rendered 
a summary judgment for defendants. From that judgment that 
plaintiff now appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purpose of this appeal, the following statement 
of facts is present: 
1. The plaintiff and the individual defendant are 
residents of Salt Lake County and the State of Utah. The 
UTAH STATE BAR maintains its office and headquarters in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. This action involves conduct 
which occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (T.R. 
78-79). 
2. RONALD OWEN NEERINGS is an adult and at the perti-
nent time as a resident of the State of Utah and Salt Lake 
County and a recent law school graduate (T.R. 79). 
3. The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental entity created 
as an administrative agency of the Utah Supreme Court for 
the purpose, among other things, of admission of attorneys 
to practice law in the State of Utah. The UTAH STATE BAR as 
a governmental entity was created by state law, Ut. Code 
Ann. §§78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) (Id.). 
4. The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental agency created 
and/or perpetuated by the Utah Supreme Court, (Rules for 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981) for the 
purpose, among other things, of admission of attorneys to 
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practice law in the State of Utah. Suit against the UTAH 
STATE BAR is authorized by Rule (A) 1. of said Rules (T.R. 
79). 
5. According to Executive Director of the Bar, Stephen 
Hutchinson, "ultimate control," over everything that the 
UTAH STATE BAR does, is exercised by the Utah Supreme Court, 
and that the UTAH STATE BAR is "completely subservient to 
and accountable to the Utah Supreme Court." (Aff. of 
Hutchinson, 1f 7, pp. 4-5) (T.R. 63-64). 
6. Kent Kasting former Bar President of the UTAH STATE 
BAR states that "the Bar is 'under the direction and con-
trol1 of the Utah Supreme Court," (Aff. of Kasting, 1f 3, p. 
2) (T.R. 71), that the UTAH STATE BAR is "entirely subject to 
and accountable to the Utah Supreme Court," (Id.), that "the 
Bar and all of its governing officials remain under the 
direct control of the Utah Supreme Court," and the "Bar was 
created by the Court and remains subject to the [Supreme] 
Court." (Id^, pp. 2-3)(T.R. 71-72). 
7. SYDNIE KUHRE, an employee of the Utah State Bar, 
was employed to perform certain duties for and is the agent, 
servant and employee of the UTAH STATE BAR. At all times 
pertinent to this action SYDNIE KUHRE was and is acting 
under the direct supervision of the Board of Commissioners 
and/or of the Utah State Bar. At all times pertinent to 
this action SYDNIE KUHRE had the duty and responsibility of 
following the policies of the Utah State Bar. The UTAH 
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STATE BAR is responsible for the conduct of the defendant 
SYDNIE KUHRE as set forth herein (T.R. 80). 
8. The plaintiff, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS, took the Utah 
Bar Examination in February, 1988, as part of the process to 
become a member of the Utah State Bar (Id.). 
9. The plaintiff, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS was required, 
in order to be a member of the UTAH STATE BAR and to prac-
tice law in the State of Utah, to pass said exam (Id.). 
10. The UTAH STATE BAR employs the defendant SYDNIE 
KUHRE as an assistant and/or secretary of the UTAH STATE BAR 
(Id.). 
11. The plaintiff did not successfully complete the 
February, 1988 Bar Examination. He officially received 
notice of his results from a member of the staff of the UTAH 
STATE BAR by phone on or about March 25, 1988 (T.R. 81). 
12. Defendant KUHRE and Jan Fasselin have been friends 
for over nine (9+) years. Their friendship dates back to 
when KUHRE was sixteen years old (Deposition of: Sydnie 
Kuhre, p. 38, lines 3-7)(T.R. 388)[hereinafter MKuhre!s 
Dep.11]. KUHRE and Fasselin continue to visit regularly 
(Id., p. 41 lines 14-17). Additionally, KUHRE and Fasselin 
speak on the telephone approximately once every one to two 
months (Id., p. 41, lines 2-3). Fasselin sends KUHRE free 
movie passes (Id., p. 49, lines 1-2). 
13. Fasselin and NEERINGS were associates. They knew 
each other and they worked on the same fl oor of the Regency 
9 
Theater (Deposition of R. Owen Neerings, p. 17, lines 17-25, 
p. 18, line 6)(T.R. 387) [hereinafter, ffNeerings! Dep."]. 
14. Earnest Hoffman, also employed by the Cineplex 
Odeon Corporation, was an associate of both NEERINGS and 
Fasselin during early 1988, when this action arose (Deposi-
tion of: Ernest Hoffman, p. 5, lines 1-25, p. 6, lines 
23-25, p. 7, lines 4-11)(T.R. 386)[hereinafter, "Hoffman's 
Dep."]. 
15. Before NEERINGS was informed of his BAR exam 
results, Fasselin told Hoffman that NEERINGS had not passed 
the exam. Fasselin1s learned of NEERINGS' failure from a 
person at the Utah State Bar (Hoffman's Dep., p. 10 lines 
1-5). 
16. Plaintiff appealed to the Utah State Bar 
Commission regarding the results of his Bar Examination. A 
hearing was held on that appeal on May 17, 1988, and a 
decision was reached on May 18, 1988 (T.R. 81). 
17. The plaintiff received written notice of the 
unfavorable decision on his appeal, in the mail, on or about 
May 27, 1988 (Id^). 
18. Fasselin knew the results of NEERINGS1 unsuccess-
ful appeal approximately one week before the Bar informed 
NEERINGS of the appeal results (Neerings' Dep., p. 21, lines 
2-4). 
19. The UTAH STATE BAR has enacted no written rules 
and regulations to protect the privacy and confidentiality 
10 
of information regarding Bar applicants under the provisions 
of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (T.R. 
82). 
20 . The defendant UTAH STATE BAR has enacted no 
written rules and regulations to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of bar results of persons failing to pass 
the Utah Bar Exam under the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (Id.). 
21. The examination of applicants seeking to be 
members of the UTAH STATE BAR and the admission of success-
ful applicants is a governmental function of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4 provides in 
pertinent part: nThe supreme court by rule shall govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law . . ." 
That governmental function has been delegated by the Utah 
Supreme Court to the UTAH STATE BAR. Rules for Integration 
and Management of the Utah State Bar, Rule (C) , § 10, (a) 
provides, in pertinent part, the Board of Commissioners of 
the UTAH STATE BAR "shall have power to determine the 
qualifications and requirements for admission to the prac-
tice of law, and to conduct examinations of applicants; 
• . . • 
22. The defendant Utah State Bar has established 
internal unwritten rules and regulations to the effect that 
negative bar results shall not be released to anyone except 
the applicant (T.R. 198). 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The UTAH STATE BAR (the Bar) is a state agency. It is 
this Court's administrative agency through which to carry 
out the duties imposed by Article VIII, Section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. The Court has designated the Bar to 
fulfill many regulatory tasks, such as screening applicants 
to the Bar, collecting mandatory license fees and punishing 
those who practice without paying (see e.g., Ut. Code Ann §§ 
78-51-10, 21, 25 (1953 as amended). The Bar is ultimately 
accountable to this Court in every respect (see Aff. of 
Hutchinson, 1 7 pp. 4-5)(T.R. 63-64). 
As a state agency, the Bar is subject to and must 
comply with the provisions of the Utah Information Practices 
Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq. (1953 as amended) (the 
Act). The Act is to protect individuals from unauthorized 
disclosure by state agencies of private information. The 
privacy portions of the Act apply to the Bar. Therefore, 
the Bar's unauthorized release of private information 
violates the Act. 
Forcing the Bar to comply with the Act does not offend 
the constitutionally mandated separation of the legislative 
and judicial branches of Utah State Government (see Utah 
Const. Art. V). There are many legislative acts that 
directly and indirectly affect the administration of justice 
12 
without infringing upon the Utah Supreme Court's mandate to 
govern the practice of law. Where the legislature acts to 
protect a person's right of privacy, and where such an act 
does not infringe upon the judiciary's constitutional 
mandate, the legislative act is valid and enforcable. 
The Utah State Legislature has expressly recognized 
that a constitutional right of privacy exists (Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-60 (2)(a)). That right is violated where a state 
agency collects confidential or private information about an 
individual and then releases the information, except under 
under certain limited circumstances (§§ 63-2-61, et seq) . 
Therefore, where the Bar releases the private Bar ex-
amination results of an unsuccessful applicant, along with 
the unsuccessful appeal thereof, to the applicant's 
co-worker, the Bar violates the Act. The defendant, SYDNIE 
KUHRE, as an employee of the Bar, must also comply with the 
Act with regard to information collected and maintained 
regarding applicants for admission to the practice of law, 
including the negative results of bar examinations. 
The standard of care common to a profession or practice 
is relevant to determining whether the professional or 
practitioner owes the claimant a duty, and whether that duty 
was breached. The Bar had a "long-standing . . . unwritten 
but strictly-enforced" policy to maintain the 
13 
confidentiality of Bar examination results (Defendant Utah 
State Bar's Answers to Interrogatories, No. 12, pp. 
5-6)(T.R. 197-198). Therefore, that internal policy is 
relevant to determining whether the Bar was negligent in 
releasing confidential information to a person who had no 
legitimate interest in that information. 
This Court has recognized an individual's common law 
right to be free from public disclosure of private facts 
(see Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1980)). 
The right protects information that would cause the indi-
vidual shame or humiliation (Id.). Whether disclosure of 
private information qualifies as "public" disclosure re-
quires an examination of the totality of the surrounding 
circumstances (see e.g., Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc. , 216 P. 2d 
571, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)). Defendants1 release 
of the plaintiff's non-passing Bar examination score, along 
with the result of the unsuccessful appeal thereof, to 
plaintiff's associate constitutes a violation of the plain-
tiff's common law privacy rights. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case is on appeal from a grant of defendants1 
motion for summary judgment, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56(b). Consequently, this Court can affirm the lower 
court's judgment only if, when viewing all the facts and 
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, it appears as a matter of law that the defendants 
are entitled to a judgment and the plaintiff is entitled to 
no relief. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS 
A STATE AGENCY 
Where integrated bars are created by the state and 
remain under state control, the integrated bars are state 
agencies. This rule holds whether the bar was created by 
statute, or judicial order. See e.g., Keller v. State Bar 
of California, 767 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1989)(en banc)(as a 
public corporation, the bar should be treated as a state 
agency to determine how the bar may expend mandatory dues), 
cert, granted, 110 S.Ct. 46 (1989); Wallace v. Wallace, 166 
S.E.2d 718 (Ga. 1969)(the statefs integrated bar "is an 
administrative arm of the court. It is a governmental 
body." Id., at 725); Ford v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections, 
15 
431 P.2d 423 (Okl. 1967); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 
7.1 
A. The Utah State Bar Is A State Agency. 
In Utah, the Bar is a state agency. Addressing the 
issue of whether action by the Bar Commissioners is State 
action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently declared: 
It is undisputed, however, that the [Barfs 
newsletter] is a publication of the Utah 
State Bar, which is a governmental entity 
established by state law and created as an 
administrative agency of the Utah Supreme 
Court. . . . [W]e find sufficient facts 
alleged from which one could conclude that 
the [Bar Commissioners1] conduct amounted 
to state action. . . . 
Barnard v. Chamberlain et al., No. 88-2131, slip op. at 6-7, 
F.2d , (10th Cir. March 8, 1990)(affirming Dis-
trict Court's Summary Judgment because the state action did 
not deprive plaintiff of a guaranteed federal right). In 
Barnard v. Chamberlain, as in the instant case, the trial 
court erroneously found as a matter of law that the Bar was 
not a state agency. The Tenth Circuit, viewing the facts in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that the 
Bar is a creature of state power, and the Bar functions as 
MWhether created by or pursuant to statutes or by court 
rules, integrated bars have common characteristics of being 
organized by or under the direction of the state, and of 
being under its direct control; and in effect such bars are 
governmental bodies.11 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 7. 
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would a state regulatory agency. Therefore, at least in 
2 
this procedural setting, the Bar is a state agency. 
The Bar owes its existence to a combination of judicial 
and legislative actions. The Supreme Court of Utah is 
inherently empowered to control the practice of law. In Re 
Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disci-
plinary Rules on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982). 
Since 1985, this Courtfs power of control has been express. 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4. In 1981, the Utah Supreme 
Court, ffacting within the powers vested in it by the Consti-
tution of this state and its inherent power over members of 
i 
the legal profession as officers of the Court, . . . perpet-
uate[d], create[d] and continue[d] under [its] direction and 
control . . . an organization known as the Utah State Bar.11 
Rule (A) 1, Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah 
State Bar [hereinafter, "Integration Rules'1]. The Bar is 
the agent and alter ego of the Utah Supreme Court, 
While the Tenth Circuit treated its denomination of the 
Bar as a question of fact, it based its denomination on 
facts that cannot be disputed. The Bar does function as a 
state agency. It plays roles that are administrative (e.g., 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-21), judicial (e.g., Ut. Code Ann. § 
78-51-10 (especially as to applicants the Bar decides are 
not suited to practice)), and quasi-judicial (e.g., Supreme 
Court Rules of Professional Practice, ch. 14). This Court 
should declare as a matter of law that the Bar is a state 
agency. In so doing, this Court would raise the Bar's duty 
of accountablility to a level commensurate with the Bar's 
power. 
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designed to perform the Court's administrative 
3 
responsibilities. 
The Legislature historically also contributed to the 
creation of the Bar. For example, the Legislature made 
licensure a mandatory prerequisite to practicing law. The 
Bar is the legislative delegate to collect the license fees, 
and to punish those who do not comply. Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
78-51-21, -25 (1953 as amended). 
The Bar is a creature of the State of Utah. It is 
empowered by state action -- currently judicially and 
previously legislatively. The Bar is ultimately accountable 
to the this Court in every respect. Because the Bar is a 
creature of the State, and completely accountable thereto, 
it must be treated as a state agency. 
The creation of the Bar by the state, and the 
accountablility of the Bar to the state are not the only 
reasons to treat the Bar as a state agency. The regulatory 
3 
See also Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen F. 
Hutchinson, 1[ 3 (T.R. 177-178) (taken in connection with 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Civil No. C-88-0578), wherein the 
Bar's current Executive Director declares: 
The Rules for Integration and Management 
of the Utah State Bar specifically state 
that the Bar is Munder the direction and 
control" of the Supreme Court. I understand 
that to mean that the Bar, in all its activities 
and functions, is under the Court's direction 
and Control. . . . As to all activities [of 
the Bar]. . . the Court retains ultimate 
control. 
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role played by the Bar is another. This Court (and previ-
ously the Legislature) delegated important regulatory tasks 
to the Bar. As explained above, the Bar is the agent 
appointed to carry out this Court's constitutional mission 
to regulate the practice of law. Integration Rule (A) 1. 
Additionally, the Bar administers the process by which Bar 
applicants are screened for fitness to practice law, and 
then are admitted if they pass muster. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-51-10 (1953 as amended); Integration Rule (A) 10(a). The 
Bar recommends the license fee to be approved by this Court, 
and then it collects the fees. Integration Rule (A) 10(a). 
The Bar is charged with punishing those who would practice 
law without paying. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-21, -25 (1953 
as amended); Integration Rule (A) 20. 
The Bar is involuntary in its membership. The Bar is 
the most visible agent acting to control the profession of 
law in Utah. The same cannot be said of any comparable 
private professional organizations, such as the American Bar 
Association, or the Utah Education Association. 
The Bar's control of the legal profession is analogous 
to the Physicians1 Licensing Board's control of the medical 
profession. Like the Bar, the physicians' Board regulates 
the admittance, licensure, and discipline of medical profes-
sionals. Utah Medical Practice Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
58-12-26, et seq. (1953 as amended). Also like the Bar, the 
Board is subject to the control of a higher state power, the 
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Commerce. Id. The Physicians' Licensing 
Board complies with the Information Practice Act, however 
(telephone interview with Dave Robinson, Dir. Ut. Div. of 
Occ. and Pro. Licensing, April 24, 1990); the Bar does not. 
B. The Act Applies To The Utah State Bar. 
By applying the Information Practices Act to the Bar, 
this Court would (1) advance the noble purpose of protecting 
individual privacy as expressed in the Act, as well as (2) 
carry out the clear statutory language of the Act. 
The Legislature was expressly motivated by its recogni-
tion of the constitutional right of privacy when it acted to 
safeguard personal data gathered by state agencies. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended). Defendants can 
offer nothing that suggests that personal data collected by 
the Bar is less worthy of protection than information 
collected by other state agencies. Forcing the Bar to 
comply with the Act would protect individuals from, and make 
the Bar accountable for, unauthorized releases of private 
and confidential information held by the Bar. 
In previous memoranda, the defendants have argued that 
even if the Bar is a governmental entity, the Act still 
should not apply to the Bar. See e.g. , Defendants' Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
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(T.R. 117) [hereinafter, "Defendants' Memo11]. Sorting 
through the Act is somewhat tedious, but not complicated. 
The clear language of the Act demonstrates that the Act 
should apply to the Bar. 
The Act defines "public offices" and "officers" as the 
offices and officers of "any court, department, division, 
board, commission, bureau, council authority, institution, 
or other agency of the state. . . . " Ut. Code Ann. § 
63-2-61 (3) (1953 as amended)(emphasis added). The Act 
defines "state agency" broadly enough to include any "de-
partment, division, board, bureau, commission, council, 
institution, authority, or other unit, however designated, 
of the state." Ut. Code Ann § 63-2-61 (2) (1953 as amend-
ed) . These definitions certainly encompass the Utah State 
Bar. 
"Private data" includes information gathered by state 
agencies which is available to the individual about whom it 
applies, and to others in strictly limited circumstances. 
Id., Subsection (12). Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as 
amended) and the Rules for Integration empower the Bar to 
collect data, including examination scores of Bar appli-
cants, in order to determine whether the applicants are 
qualified to practice law in Utah. Passing scores are used 
by the Bar and by this Court to gauge an applicant's fitness 
to practice law. Non-passing scores are used only by the 
Bar in order to separate the unsuccessful applicant from the 
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qualified applicants recommended to the Supreme Court. See 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as amended). Bar exam scores 
have no other purpose. The Bar applicant's exam score is 
private data. 
A "responsible authority1' is the state official or 
office established by law to collect, use, or supervise any 
set of data, personal or otherwise. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 
(8) (1953 as amended). Since the Rules for Integration and 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as amended) authorize the Bar 
to collect information on Bar applicants, including exam 
results, the Bar and its employees are responsible author-
ities with regard to those results. 
Responsible authorities must prevent the unauthorized 
disclosure of private data. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-85.4 (4) 
(1953 as amended). Unauthorized disclosure of private data 
subjects the responsible authority to liability for damages. 
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended). In the instant 
case, the disclosure of plaintiff's unsuccessful Bar 
application represents an unauthorized disclosure of private 
data. Hence, the defendants are liable for violating the 
Act. 
Defendants have spent considerable energy in memoranda 
arguing that the privacy portions of the Act are applicable 
only to executive branch state agencies. See Defendants' 
Memo, pp. 4-13 (T.R. 120-129). Significantly, the Act 
distinguishes between the records management portion of the 
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Act and the information practices portion of the Act. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 63-2-63 (l)(b), (d) (1953 as amended). In fact, 
prior to 1979, the records management portion of the current 
Act was contained in a separate statute from the Information 
4 
Practices Act. 
Plaintiff agrees that the records Management program of 
the archives act is arguably applicable only to the execu-
tive branch of state government. See Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
63-2-75, -79 (1953 as amended). However, contrary to 
defendants1 assertions, the information practices portion of 
the Act is not limited to the executive branch. In fact, 
for the Legislature to limit privacy protections to only the 
executive branch would violate the Legislature's own reading 
of the constitution. Distinguishing between the respon-
sibility of the judicial and executive branches to avoid 
unauthorized disclosure of private information does not make 
sense. This Court should not read such a distinction into 
the Act where there is none written. The privacy portions 
of the Act apply to every branch of the state government. 
i 
The Bar is a state agency because it was created by the 
state, and because it is perpetuated by the state. Also, 
The statutes regarding the archives and records service 
were found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et. seq. (1953 as 
amended in 1969). The Utah Information Practice Act was 
found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-50-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended 
in 1975). Why they were combined by the legislature in 1979 
is unclear. 
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the Bar functions as a state regulatory agency. Consequent-
ly, the Information Practices Act apply to the Bar. 
Unsuccessful bar exam results, and appeals thereof, are 
private data about individuals that are available to state 
agencies for specified purposes. The Bar and its employees 
are liable for damages for releasing negative Bar exam 
results without proper authorization. 
POINT II 
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT 
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
Applying the Information Practices Act to the Bar does 
not violate the Constitution of the State of Utah. The 
Constitution forbids the Legislature from encroaching on 
powers exclusively reserved to the judiciary. Utah Const., 
Art. V, § 1. The Supreme Court of Utah shall govern the 
practice of law within this state. Id., Art. VIII, § 4. 
Absent evidence that applying the Act to the Bar would 
encroach upon this Court's authority, the constitutionality 
of the legislative enactment must be presumed. Lehi City v. 
Meiling, City Recorder, 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935). 
Where the Legislature acts within its constitutional 
bounds, and where it advances the public welfare without 
"embarrass[ing] the court or impair[ing] its constitutional 
functions,11 the Legislature has not acted unconstitution-
ally. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 826-827 (1961) 
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(opinion by Brennan, J.); see e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 691 
P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1984)(application of consumer pro-
tection laws to law firms does not impermissibly infringe 
upon the Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to regulate 
the practice of law). 
Certainly not every statute affecting the judiciary is 
unconstitutional. There are many statutes that affect the 
judiciary in Utah. In the instant case, forcing the Bar 
to protect the privacy of Bar applicants would not interfere 
with this Court's governance of the practice of law. The 
Act allows for the use and transfer of private and confiden-
tial information held by state agencies, so long as the 
transfer is authorized. The Act would merely impose upon 
The Legislature sets a budget for the operation of the 
state courts. The Bar itself was originally created by the 
legislature, Utah Code Ann. §§78-51-1, et seq. (1953 as 
amended). The legislature has also: required the courts to 
conduct all proceedings in English, Utah Code Ann. §78-7-22 
(1953 as amended); established the parameters of contempt, 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-32-1, et seq. (1953 as amended); 
established judicial salaries, Utah Code Ann. §§67-8-1, et 
seq. (1953 as amended) and established the powers of every 
judicial officer, Utah Code Ann. §78-7-17 (1953 as amended). 
Other examples include: Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
§78-7-1 (conflicts of interest), §78-7-18 (power to punish 
contempt), § 78-7-9.5 (service of a judge in another 
division or court), § 77-35-29 (disability of judges), 
§77-35-29 (judicial bias or prejudice), §78-34-8 (powers of 
judge concerning eminent domain), §78-7-16 (judicial powers 
out of court), §30-3-17 (powers and jurisdiction of family 
courts), §78-7-27 (appointment of judicial conduct commit-
tee), §78-2-1 (number of justices, selection and functions), 
§78-2-2 (Supreme Court jurisdiction), §78-7-30 (privileged 
nature of complaints and testimony), §78-7-28 (involuntary 
retirement of judges), and §20-1-7.1 (process for filling 
vacancies). 
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the Bar the same duties of confidentiality and accountabil-
ity that the Bar imposes by ethical rules upon the lawyers 
of Utah. 
According to the express language of the Act, the 
legislature only imposes upon the Bar a procedure designed 
to promote the "fundamental constitutional11 right of 
privacy. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended). 
The plaintiff in this case seeks merely to prevent unau-
thorized disclosure of private information. Further, the 
Act would impose no requirements upon the Bar beyond those 
that the Bar already purports to observe. Enforcing the Act 
upon the Bar would not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
Imposing the requirements of the Information Practices 
Act on the Bar does not rise to the level of intrusion upon 
the judiciary's powers present in cases cited by the defen-
dants in previous memoranda. See e.g., Matter of Washington 
State Bar Association, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash 1976), Ex Parte 
Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980)(in 
both cases, the legislative branch was a party to attempts 
to audit bar accounts for evidence of malfeasance); Sharood 
v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973)(a legislative 
attempt to gain complete fiscal control of the state bar to 
the exclusion of the judiciary); Pasik v. State Board of Law 
Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. 1984)(an attempt to force 
disclosure of information from the bar pursuant to a state 
freedom of information act). By contrast, the plaintiff in 
this case merely seeks to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
private information concerning him. 
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POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY IN UTAH, 
The Information Practices Act clearly evidences the 
Legislature's recognition of the right to privacy: 
(2) In enacting this act, th£ Legislature recog-
nizes two fundamental constitutional rights: (a) 
the right of privacy in relation to personal data 
gathered by state agencies, ajid (b) the public's 
right of access to information concerning the 
conduct of the public's business. 
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended)(emphasis 
added). See also, Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Briggs, 675 F.Supp. 1308, 1309 (D.Utah 1987) ("[I]n enacting 
the Archives and Records Service Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59, et seq. (1986), the Legislature articulated and 
memorialized the following public polidy: [text of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) quoted as abova]"). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in Redding v. 
Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1980) recognized a "right to 
privacy" in relation to governmental disclosures of personal 
information as determined "by applying the commonly accepted 
standards of social propriety." Id. 
By releasing his exam and appeal results without any 
need or authorization, the Bar violate^, the plaintiff's 
constitutional right to privacy. 
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POINT IV 
THE INTERNAL RULES OF 
THE UTAH STATE BAR 
CREATE A STANDARD OF CONDUCT. 
Under the Bar's internal standards and rules it owed 
the plaintiff a duty of confidentiality. The unauthorized 
disclosure of the confidential information breached that 
duty. As a consequence, the defendants were negligent. 
The generally accepted practices within a profession or 
practice are relevant to establish the standard of care owed 
by a particular professional or practitioner. Those accept-
ed practices may determine what duty was owing the plain-
tiff, and whether that duty was breached. Meese v. Brigham 
Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Crandall v. Ed 
Gardner Plumbing and Heating, 405 P.2d 611 (Utah 1965); 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company, 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 
1985); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Wusich, 375 P.2d 
364 (Ariz. 1962). See Intermountain Farmers Association v. 
Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978); Jorgensen v. Issa, 
739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The unwritten internal rules and regulations of the 
Utah State Bar prohibit disclosure of private information 
about Bar applicants: 
All information regarding the results of 
Bar examinations is kept strictly confi-
dential. The only information regarding 
the results of Bar examinations ever 
publicly disclosed is a list of those who 
passed the Bar examination. There are no 
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written rules or regulations regarding 
confidentiality of information regarding 
Bar applicants and the results of Bar 
examinations. Such information is kept 
strictly confidential pursuant to long-
standing but strictly-enforced policies 
of the Bar. 
Defendants1 Answers to Interrogatories (f 12, pp. 5-6, Aug. 
12, 1988)(T.R. 197-198) . 
The Bar's Executive Director acknowledges a "long -
standing" policy of maintaining the confidentiality of Bar 
exam results. Id. That acknowledged policy creates a duty 
of confidentiality. The Bar's unauthorized release of the 
confidential exam results breached that duty. The subse-
quent unauthorized release of the results of the plaintiff's 
appeal of the exam results compounded the original breach. 
The Bar's unwritten policies are evidence of the Bar's 
standard of conduct. Therefore, viewing the facts of this 
case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Bar's 
breaches give rise to a claim of negligence. 
POINT V 
THE BAR INVADED PLAINTIFF'S PRIVACY 
The unauthorized release of plaintiff's exam and appeal 
results invaded his privacy. The public disclosure of 
private facts is actionable under the common law claim of 
"invasion of privacy." Essentially, there are two (2) main 
components to such a claim. First, the information must 
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have been sufficiently embarrassing. Second, the publica-
tion must have been sufficiently wide spread. 
This Court !Tagree[s] with the general proposition that' 
there is and should be such a right [of privacy] which 
protects against any wrongful or unseemly intrusion into 
what should properly be regarded as one's personal affairs." 
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1980)(footnote 
omitted). In defining the extent of the right of privacy, 
this Court stated: 
It seems sufficient for our purposes 
herein to say that what the right 
protects is to be determined by app-
lying the commonly accepted standards 
of social propriety. . . . The right 
should extend to protect against in-
trusion into or exposure of not only 
things which might result in actual 
harm or damage, but also to things 
which might result in shame or humi-
liation, or merely violate one's pride 
in keeping his private affairs to him-
self. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
In applying that standard, this Court cannot determine, 
as a matter of law, that the unauthorized release to col-
leagues of failing Bar exam results and the unsuccessful 
appeal thereof would not result in plaintiff's shame or 
humiliation. Further, such disclosure would violate any 
reasonable person's pride in keeping his private affairs to 
himself. Certainly, the plaintiff's unsuccessful Bar 
application was of "no proper concern to others." Id. 
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In Redding, this Court held that the annual salary of a 
state college professor was private information worthy of 
protection under "commonly accepted standards of social 
propriety." Id. If not revealing such a person's annual 
salary is worthy of constitutional protection, then so is 
the fact that a person failed a professional examination 
after three (3) years of law school and extensive prepara-
tion. 
Whether publication of private facts is sufficiently 
wide spread to state a cause of action depends upon the 
surrounding circumstances. See Prosser & Keeton, Prosser on 
Torts, 5th ed., § 117, pp. 857-858. Significantly, broad 
publication is not required when there is a breach of 
contract, trust or confidence. See Copley v. Northwestern 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., (S.D. W.Va.1968) 295 F.Supp. 93; 
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, (Idaho 1961) 367 P.2d 
284; Berry v. Moench, (Utah 1958) 331 P.2d 814; See Note, 
1959, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 943. 
Further, there are other circumstances where something 
less than wide spread publication may Constitute an 
actionable breach of privacy. For example, if the person is 
not a public figure, then disclosure of private facts to his 
co-workers, family, or neighbors may constitute "public 
disclosure." Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 
1977). Long ago it was recognized that ft[t]he oral dis-
semination of private matter may be as rapid as the wagging 
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tongue of gossip and as devastating as the printed page." 
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 216 P.2d 571, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1950)(disposition of privacy claim not reached due to 
plaintiff's success on other claim). 
In light of the nature of the confidential and compul-
sory relationship between the Utah State Bar and the plain-
tiff, the use of a billboard by the defendants to broadcast 
the embarrassing information is not necessary to invade 
plaintifffs privacy or give rise to a cause of action. The 
needless and unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffTs 
unsuccessful exam and appeal to his work-place associates 
constitutes disclosure of private information sufficient to 
state a claim of common law invasion of privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah State Bar is a state agency to which the 
Information Practices Act should apply. Applying that Act 
to the Bar would not offend the Separation of Powers doc-
trine. The Legislature has expressly recognized a constitu-
tional right of privacy in the language of the Act. The 
Bar's own internal policies establish a duty owed to plain-
tiff, and breached by the Bar. The Bar's unauthorized 
release of the plaintiff's exam score, and unsuccessful 
appeal thereof, represent actionable public disclosures of 
private facts. 
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This Court should reverse the lower court's summary 
judgment and remand this matter for trial. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
78-51-10. Admission to practice law — Qualifications — 
Enrollment — Oath — Fees. 
The board of commissioners shall have power to determine the qualifica-
tions and requirements for admission to the practice of law, and to conduct 
examinations of applicants; and it shall from time to time certify to the Su-
preme Court those applicants found to be qualified; provided, that the qualifi-
cations and requirements for admission to the practice of law shall be as 
follows: each applicant shall be a citizen of the United States or a person who 
has bona fide declared his intention to become one in the manner required by 
law, of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and must produce 
satisfactory testimonial of good moral character; have had a preliminary edu-
cation other than legal and have regularly and attentively studied law for a 
period of at least three years; and have passed a satisfactory examination 
upon the principles of common law, equity, criminal law and the statutes and 
practice of this state; provided, that until the 1st day of July, 1932, no exami-
nation for admission to practice shall be required of regular graduates of the 
law school of the University of Utah. The approval by the Supreme Court of 
any person so certified shall entitle him to be enrolled in the bar of this state 
upon his taking an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and 
of this state and to faithfully discharge the duties of an attorney and counselor 
to the best of his knowledge and ability, and the payment of the fee provided 
by law, and thereafter to practice law upon payment of the license fees herein 
provided, subject to the provisions of this title. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 10; RJS. 1933 & Cross-References. — Fee for certificate of 
C. 1943, 6-0-10. admission, § 21-1-4. 
78-51-2L Annual license — Fees — Disbursement of funds. 
Every person practicing, or holding himself out as practicing law within 
this state, or holding himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice 
or carry on the calling of a lawyer within this state shall, prior to so doing and 
prior to the first day of April of each year, pay to the Utah State Bar a license 
fee in an amount to be fixed by the board of commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar with the approval of the Supreme Court to effectuate the purposes of this 
title. These funds shall be administered by the Utah State Bar. All moneys 
derived from license fees, previously transferred to the state treasurer and not 
expended as of the effective date of this act, shall be returned to the Utah 
State Bar for the purposes of carrying out the object of this chapter. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48,1 12; R.S. 1933 & last sentence of this section, means May 11, 
C. 1943,6-0-20; L. 1957, ch. 175, § 1; 1965, ch. 1971. the effective date of Laws 1971, Chapter 
173, § 1; 1971, ch. 215, I 1. 215, which amended this section. 
"Effective date of this act". — The term Cross-References. — Professional Corpora-
"effective date of this act," referred to in the tion Act, § 16-11*1 et seq. 
78-51-25, Practicing without a license prohibited — Action 
or proceedings to enforce — Exception. 
No person who is not duly admitted and licensed to practice law within this 
state nor any person whose right or license to so practice has terminated 
either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license fee or otherwise, 
shall practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person 
qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within the state. Such 
practice, or assumption to act or holding out, by any such unlicensed or dis-
barred or suspended person shall not constitute a crime, but this prohibition 
against the practice of law by any such person shall be enforced by such civil 
action or proceedings, including quo warranto, contempt or injunctive pro-
ceedings, as may be necessary and appropriate, which action or which pro-
ceedings shall be instituted by the board of commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar; providing, that in any action or proceeding to enforce the prohibition 
against the practice of law, the accused shall be entitled to a trial by jury. 
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person who is unlicensed as an 
attorney from personally representing his own interests in a cause to which he 
is a party in his own right and not as assignee. 
History: US. 1898 & C.L. 1907, S 112; C.L. Extraordinary writs, Rules of Civil Proce-
1917, § 323; L. 1931, ch. 48, § 21; R.S. 19334k dure. Rule 65B. 
C. 1943, 6-0-24; L. 1963, ck 196. § 1. Injunctions, Rules of Civtt Procedure, Rule 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 63A. 
§ 78-32-1 et seq. 
